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ABSTRACT
The surging availability of electronic medical records (EHR) leads
to increased research interests in medical predictive modeling. Re-
cently many deep learning based predicted models are also de-
veloped for EHR data and demonstrated impressive performance.
However, a series of recent studies showed that these deep mod-
els are not safe: they suffer from certain vulnerabilities. In short,
a well-trained deep network can be extremely sensitive to inputs
with negligible changes. These inputs are referred to as adversarial
examples. In the context of medical informatics, such attacks could
alter the result of a high performance deep predictive model by
slightly perturbing a patient’s medical records. Such instability not
only reflects the weakness of deep architectures, more importantly,
it offers a guide on detecting susceptible parts on the inputs. In this
paper, we propose an efficient and effective framework that learns a
time-preferential minimum attack targeting the LSTM model with
EHR inputs, and we leverage this attack strategy to screen medical
records of patients and identify susceptible events and measure-
ments. The efficient screening procedure can assist decision makers
to pay extra attentions to the locations that can cause severe conse-
quence if not measured correctly. We conduct extensive empirical
studies on a real-world urgent care cohort and demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed screening approach.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed substantial success on applying deep
learning techniques in data analysis in various application domains,
such as computer vision, natural language processing, and speech
recognition. Those modern machine learning techniques have also
demonstrated great potentials in clinical informatics [36]. For exam-
ple, deep learning has been used to learn effective representations
for patient records [14, 26] to support disease phenotyping [8] and
conduct predictive modeling [9, 30, 33]. A recent study from Google
demonstrated the capability of deep learning methods on predic-
tive modeling with electronic health records (EHR) over traditional
state-of-art approaches [1].
Deep learning approaches have a few key advantages over tra-
ditional machine learning approaches, including the capability of
exploring complicated relationships within the data through the
highly non-linear architecture, and building an end-to-end analyt-
ics pipeline without the process of handcrafted feature engineering.
Most of these perks are backed by complex neural networks and
a large volume of training data. However, such complex networks
could lead to vulnerable decision boundaries according to statistical
learning theory. This effect could be further exacerbated by the
sparse, noisy and high-dimensional nature of medical data. For ex-
ample, in our experiments, we show that a well-trained deep model
may classify a dying patient to be healthy when the patient’s record
changed a bit, especially for those close to the decision boundary.
In addition, certain clinical measurements may be more susceptible
to this type of perturbation than others for a given patient. In this
work, we propose to take advantage of such vulnerability of deep
neural networks to identify susceptible events and measurements
in each patient’s medical records such that additional attention
from clinicians/nurses is required.
The vulnerability of deep neural networks has been brought up in
recent studies, e.g., Szegedy et al. first introduced this concept when
investigating the properties of neural networks [37]. They found
that even a high-performance deep model can be easily “fooled”,
e.g., an image classified correctly by the model can be misclassified
with human-imperceptible perturbations. Plenty of later studies
demonstrated neural networks to be fragile under these so-called
adversarial attacks, where adversarial examples were generated to
attack deep models using elegantly designed algorithms. Intuitively,
if we can attack a high performance medical predictive model and
generate such adversarial medical records from the original medical
records of one patient, then these perturbations in the medical
records can inform us where the susceptible events/measurements
are located.
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Currently, most existing attack techniques focused on image
related tasks where convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are
primarily used. In the medical informatics domain, however, one
major focus remains on predictive modeling with sequentialmedical
records [14, 40]. In order to craft efficient and effective adversarial
examples, several challenges persist despite the progress of current
attack algorithms. First, unlike images, medical features are hetero-
geneous, carrying different levels and aspects of information, thus
resulting in different tolerance to perturbations. Second, for time
sequence data, the effectiveness of perturbations may vary along
time, e.g., perturbing a distant time stamp may not work as well as
a recent one. Third, since we are interested in utilizing attacks to
infer susceptible locations, a sparse attack is preferred over a dense
one. However, sparse attacks tend to have larger magnitudes than
dense attacks, and no explicit evaluation metrics for sparse attacks
has been established yet.
Therefore, to address the aforementioned challenges, we pro-
pose an effective and efficient framework for generating adversar-
ial examples for temporal sequence data. Specifically, our sparse
adversarial attack approach is based on optimization and can be
efficiently solved via an iterative procedure, which automatically
learns a time-preferential sparse attack with minimum perturbation
on input sequences. From the attack model, we designed a Suscep-
tibility Score for each measurement at both individual-level and
population-level, which can be used to screen medical records from
different patients and identify vulnerable locations. We also define
a new evaluation metric that considers both sparsity and magnitude
of a certain attack. We evaluate our attack approach and suscep-
tibility score in the real-world urgent care cohort MIMIC3 [22],
and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach from
extensive quantitative and qualitative results. In the context of our
paper, we mainly verify our methods on medical data, but the attack
framework can be easily extended to any other fields.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we summarize
related work in Section 2; the proposed framework is presented in
Section 3; experimental results are shown in Section 4 and conclu-
sion reaches at Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
Our work lies in the junction of adversarial attacks and recurrent
neural networks on medical informatics. Therefore, we briefly sum-
marize recent advances for both fields in this section.
Recurrent Neural Networks on Medical Informatics. Recur-
rent neural network (RNN) and its variants, such as gated recurrent
unit (GRU) [12] and long short-term memory (LSTM) [18], are de-
signed for analyzing sequence data and has been widely used in
computer vision and natural language processing. Despite the fact
that medical records often consist of time series, applications of
RNN in medical informatics are much less compared to those in
language domain. For example, [24] first utilized LSTM on EHR
for multi-label classification of diagnoses and a similar study [13]
applied GRU to predict diagnose and medication categories using
encounter records. [4] developed a time-aware LSTM to address
the differences of time intervals in medical records. Most recently,
a comprehensive study [1] showed superior performance achieved
by RNN on predictive modeling with EHR records compared to
traditional approaches, calling for more applications of such deep
models on medical sequential data. While on the other side, the
weakness of deep neural networks was disclosed under more ex-
ploration of network properties.
Adversarial Attacks on Deep Networks. Following the discov-
ery of deep network vulnerability, different algorithms have been
developed for crafting adversarial examples to better understand the
robustness of a deep network. The goal of the attacking algorithm
is to crafts an adversarial sample by adding a small perturbation on
a clean sample such that the outcome of a deep model changes after
the perturbation. Below we briefly introduce adversarial attacks on
different types of deep models.
CNN Attacks. There are many existing studies on CNN attacks.
Szegedy et al. first introduced adversarial examples for deep learn-
ing in [37], where adversarial examples are obtained by solving
an optimization with box-constraints. [15] proposed a fast gradi-
ent sign method (FGS) that uses the gradient of loss function with
respect to input data to generate adversarial examples. In Deep-
Fool [28], an iterative ℓ2-regularized algorithm is adopted to find
the minimum perturbation that changes the result of a classifier.
A universal perturbation [27] is also formulated later based on
DeepFool. JSMA [31] is a Jacobian-based saliency map algorithm
which creates a direct mapping between inputs and outputs during
training, and crafts adversarial examples by modifying a fraction
of features (the most influential) iteratively. Instead of leveraging
network loss and gradients, Carlini and Wagner [7] proposed new
objective functions based on the logit layer to generate adversarial
examples (C&W attack). They handle the box-constraint by using a
tanh transformation and also consider different distance metrics (ℓ0,
ℓ2, ℓ∞). Chen et al. extended C&W attack to L1 distortion metrics
and proposed an elastic-net regularized framework [10] for adver-
sarial generation. Zeroth order optimization (ZOO) based attack
[11] is a black-box attack algorithm. Different from using network
gradients directly, it estimates gradients and Hessian via symmetric
difference quotient for crafting adversarial examples. There are
other types of adversarial examples like [29], and other generat-
ing approaches including GAN attacks [39], ensemble attacks [25],
ground truth attacks [6], hot/cold attacks [34], feature adversary
[35] which we do not present further details.
RNN Attacks.Most previous efforts for crafting adversarial ex-
amples were made on image classification tasks in the domain of
computer vision. Adversarial on deep sequential models are less
frequent compared to CNN attacks. For RNN attacks, one focus
has been emerged on natural language processing where adver-
sarial examples are generated by adding, removing, or changing
words in a sentence [21, 23, 32]. However, those perturbations are
usually perceptible to human beings. Another application is on
malware detection which is a classification task on sequential in-
puts. [16] generated adversarial examples by leveraging algorithms
of DNN attacks. [3, 20] used GAN based algorithm and [2] used
reinforcement learning to generate adversarial examples.
In summary, neither have the aforementioned attacks been used
to verify the robustness of RNN models on medical sequence data,
nor have they been utilized to provide additional important infor-
mation located in medical records and thus improves the quality of
modern clinical care.
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3 METHOD
Thoughmuch of the prior efforts have focused on attack and protect
strategies of deep models, in this work, we take a radically different
perspective from existing works and leverage the vulnerability
of the deep models to inspect the features and data points in the
datasets that are sensitive to the complex decision hyperplanes of
powerful deep models. When dealing with electronic health records
(EHR), such susceptible locations allows us to develop an efficient
screening technique for EHR. In this section, we first introduce the
problem setting of adversarial attacks, and then propose a novel
attack strategy to efficiently identifying susceptible locations. We
then use the attacking strategy to derive a susceptibility score which
can be deployed in healthcare systems.
The proposed framework of adversarial generation is illustrated
in Figure 1. It consists of three parts: (1) building a predictive model
whichmaps time-series EHR data to clinical labels such as diagnoses
or mortality, (2) generating adversarial medical records based on the
output of the predictive model, and (3) computing the susceptibility
score based on the adversarial samples.
3.1 Predictive Modeling from Electronic
Medical Records
Medical records for one patient can be represented by a multivariate
time series matrix [4, 38, 40]. Assume we have a set of d medical
features in the EHR system and a total of ti time points available
patient i , then the patient EHR data can be represented by a matrix
X (i) ∈ Rd×ti = [x (i)1 ,x
(i)
2 , . . . ,x
(i)
ti ]. Note that for different patients,
the observation length ti could be different due to the frequency
of visits and length of enrollment. At the predictive modeling step,
a model is trained to map EHR features of a patient to clinically
meaningful labels such as diagnoses, mortality and other clinical
assessments. In this paper, we limit our discussions in the scope
of classification, i.e., we would like to learn a c-class prediction
model f (X (i)) : Rd×ti → {0, 1, . . . , c} from our data. We use in-
hospital mortality as the running example, where 0 and 1 represent
alive and deceased status, respectively. We note that the technique
discussed in this paper can be applied to other predictive tasks such
as phenotyping and diagnostic prediction.
Recurrent neural networks (RNN) are recently adopted in many
predictive modeling studies and achieved state-of-the-art predictive
performance, because (1) RNN can naturally handle input data of
different lengths and (2) some variants such as long short-term
memory (LSTM) networks have demonstrated excellent capability
of learning long-term dependencies and are capable of dealing with
irregular time interval between time series events [4]. Without loss
of generality, we use a standard LSTM network as our base pre-
dictive model. Given a dataset of n patients, D = {(X (i),y(i))}ni=1,
where for each patient we have a set of medical records X (i) and
a target label y(i). The LSTM network parameters are collected
denoted by θ , and the deep network model is trained by minimizing
the following loss function:
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
−
(
y(i) log
(
y
(i)
θ
)
+
(
1 − y(i)
)
log
(
1 − y(i)θ
))
,
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Figure 1: Illustration of the proposed framework of identify-
ing sensitive locations in electronic medical records. Adver-
sarial records are generated by an adversarial attack proce-
dure, which are then used to compute a susceptibility score
distribution over the medical records. The distribution is
then used to bring attention to clinicians of entires that
cause high damage if not accurately recorded or measured.
where y(i)θ = f (X (i);θ ) is output of the network. The loss function
is minimized by gradient descent via backpropagation algorithm.
Let θ∗ be the parameter obtained by the algorithm from the training
dataset D, and we denote the final predictive model by fθ ∗ (·).
3.2 Adversarial Medical Records Generation
Our framework is to utilize adversarial attacks to detect suscepti-
ble locations in medical records, and an efficient adversarial attack
strategy is the key component in this framework. Adversarial exam-
ples are usually generated by exploiting internal state information
of a high performing pre-trained deep predictive model, which
can be the intermediate output or gradients. The existing attack
algorithms can be roughly grouped into two prototypes: iterative
attacks and optimization-based attacks. The former iteratively add
perturbations to original input until some conditions are met. For
example, fast gradient sign method (FGS) [15] uses gradients of the
loss function with respect to input data points to generate adver-
sarial examples.On the other hand, optimization-based attacks cast
the generation procedure into an optimization problem in which
the perturbation can be analytically computed. Optimization based
attacks are shown to have superior performance on adversarial
attacks compared to iterative methods [10, 11].
In order to generate efficient perturbations for medical records,
in this paper we propose an optimization-based attack strategy.
Existing attack strategies typically seek a dense perturbation of
an input. Jointly perturbing on multiple locations simultaneously
can take full advantage of the complexity of the decision surface
to achieve minimal perturbation. As long as the magnitude of the
perturbed locations is small enough, then it can hardly be per-
ceived by human. However, such dense perturbation strategy is not
so meaningful in healthcare, as dense perturbations could easily
change the underlying structures of medical records, and introduce
comorbidity related to diseases originally not associated with the
patient. For example, if a perturbation simultaneously adds the
diagnosis features of Hypertension and Heart Failure to a patient
who never had these before, it is likely that we are creating new
pathology associated to cardiovascular disease. This suggests that
focused (sparse) attacks are preferred in our problem.
Formally, given a well performed predictive model, fθ ∗ (·) and a
patient record X , our goal is to find an adversarial medical record
X˜ of the same size, such that X˜ is close to X but with a different
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Algorithm 1: Adversarial records generation.
Input: A high performance predictive model fθ ∗ (·), original
clean record X and an adversarial label y˜, step size α ,
L1 regularization parameter λ, and the maximum
iteration tmax.
Output: The adversarial record X˜
1 Initialize X˜ ← X
2 for i = 0 to tmax do
3 X˜ (i+1) = Sλ
(
X˜ (i) − α · ∇J
(
X˜ (i)
))
,
4 where ∇J (·) is the gradient of the loss function in (1)
5 y˜
(i+1)
θ = fθ ∗
(
X˜ (i+1)
)
6 if y(i+1)θ = y˜ then
7 break
8 return X ′
classification result from the given deep model. Let yθ be a source
label currently outputted by the predictive model fθ ∗ (·), and we
would like the predictive model to classify X˜ into an adversarial
class label y˜θ , yθ , while minimizing the difference X − X˜ . As in
our mortality prediction example, if a patient is originally predicted
to be alive, we would like to find the minimal sparse perturbation
X − X˜ to make our model predict the deceased label. We note that it
is not necessary for this patient to be a part of the dataset training
the model fθ ∗ . We propose to obtain the adversarial sample X˜ by
solving the following sparsity-regularized attack objective:
min
X˜
max
{[
Logit(X˜ )]yθ − [Logit(X˜ )]y˜θ ,−κ} + λ∥X˜ − X ∥1, (1)
where Logit(·) denotes outputs before the Softmax layer in the pre-
trained predictive model, κ ≥ 0 ensures a gap between the source
label yθ and the adversarial label y˜θ , and ∥A∥1 =
∑
i
∑
j |Ai j | is an
element-wise ℓ1 norm. To create adversarial examples with smaller
perturbations, κ is commonly set to 0. The loss function is similar to
the one in C&W [7] and EAD attack [10], aiming to assign label y˜θ
the most probable class for X . The ℓ1 norm regularization induces
sparsity on the perturbation and encourages the desired focused
attacks. Additionally, based on the hypothesis that different features
have different tolerances and temporal structures might also effect
the distribution of susceptible regions, regularization also avoids
large perturbations and leads to attacks that have unique structures
at both time and feature levels.
Similar to [10], we use the iterative soft thresholding algorithm
(ISTA) optimization procedure [5] to solve the objective, where
for each record value, the algorithm performs a soft thresholding
Sλ(·) to shrink a perturbation to 0 if the deviance to original record
is less than λ at each iteration, where soft thresholding performs
an element-wise shrinkage of a, i.e., Sλ(a) = max(a − λ, 0). The
generation procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Given different strengths of regularization, we end up with a set
of adversarial candidates for each medical record matrix. We pick
optimal adversarial records based on evaluation metrics below.
3.3 Evaluation of Focused EHR Attacks
Recall that in the detection of susceptible locations in medical
records, a focused sparse attack is preferred over a dense one due to
the aforementioned reasons. However, using existing attack evalua-
tion metrics such as the magnitude of the perturbation and accuracy
of the attacks, a dense one is almost always more efficient than a
sparse one because the attacks strategies can fully leverage the com-
plicated decision surface. An analogy is to consider the attacking
strategies in the context of the machine learning paradigm. If we
perform learning and evaluation on the same training data, then the
“best performing” model will be the one that uses no regularization
at all, and therefore the testing data is critical for a fair evaluation
of the learned model. This is why we need an evaluation strategy
that is designed specifically for our attack budget (sparsity).
However, there are currently no metrics in the literature that
evaluates both perturbation scale and degree of focus. Therefore, we
propose a novel evaluation scheme which measures the quality of a
perturbation by considering both the perturbation magnitude and
the structure of the attacks. Given an adversarial record X˜ ∈ Rd×t ,
the perturbation is defined as:
∆X = X˜ − X .
Thus, the maximum absolute perturbation for an observation (MAP )
and the percentage of record values that being perturbed (PP ) can
be written as:
MAP(∆X ) = max (|∆X |), PP(∆X ) = ∥∆X ∥0
d · t , (2)
where | · | is element-wise absolute value. To make perturbations
comparable, we normalize our data into [0, 1] range using min-max
normalization before any experiments (will be covered in section
4). Since both measures behave like a rate ranging from 0 to 1 and
we want both to be small, we define the Perturbation Distance Score
metrics as follows:
D∆X =
√
MAP(∆X )2 + β · PP(∆X )2, (3)
which geometrically measures a weighted distance between point
(MAP , PP ) and original coordinate. β is a weighting parameter that
controls which measure is emphasized. In our case, we are more
concerned about sparsity and set β = 2. The perturbation distance
score is used for selecting the best adversarial record for a given
observation under different sparsity control. A lower score indicates
better quality of perturbation in terms of magnitude and degree of
focus.
3.4 Susceptibility Scores for EHR Screening
Besides individual-level perturbation measure, we are also inter-
ested in the susceptibility of a certain feature or time stamp at a
population-level. These measurements serve to identify the suscep-
tible locations over the entirety of our medical records. We propose
three metrics for assessing susceptibility. For simplicity, we assume
that the EHR records of all patients have the same lengthT , and we
collectively denote the optimal adversarial examples for all patients
in a tensor X˜ = [X˜ (1), X˜ (2), . . . , X˜ (n)] ∈ Rn×d×t , whose perturba-
tion is denoted by ∆X. For the time-feature grid of time stamp i and
feature j , we calculate global maximum perturbation (GMP ), global
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average perturbation (GAP ) and the probability of being perturbed
across all records (GPP ):
GMPi, j = max
1≤k≤n
(|∆Xi, j,k |),
GAPi, j =
1
n
∑n
k=1 (|∆Xi, j,k |),
GPPi, j =
∥∆Xi, j, ·∥0
n
.
The susceptibility score for a certain time-feature location is thus
defined by:
Si j = {GMP ⊙ GPP}i j , (4)
where ⊙ denotes element-wise product. The rationale behind this
score is the expectation of maximum perturbation for a certain
time-measurement grid considering all observations within a popu-
lation. A larger score indicates high susceptibility of corresponding
location with respect to certain diagnose under current predictive
model. We also adopt a cumulative susceptibility score for each
measurement defined as:
Sj =
∑t
i=1{GMP ⊙ GPP}i j , (5)
which indicates overall susceptibility at the measurement level.
3.5 Screening Procedure
We summarize here the procedure of the proposed susceptibility
screening framework. For each medical record, we utilize the at-
tack algorithm described in Algorithm 1 to perturb the existing
deep predictive model until the classification result changes. At
each iteration, we evaluate on current adversarial record. Once the
result changes, we stop and output the result which can be used
for calculating different scores. We picked the optimal adversarial
example for each EHR matrix based on perturbation distance score.
We then use the adversarial example to compute the susceptibility
score for the EHR as well as the cumulative susceptibility score for
different measurements.
4 EXPERIMENT
4.1 Data Preprocessing
In this work, we use MIMIC-III (Medical Information Mart for In-
tensive Care III) [22] as our primary data. This dataset contains
health-related information for over 45,000 de-identified patients
who stayed in the critical care units of the Beth Israel Deaconess
Medical Center between 2001 and 2012. MIMIC-III contains informa-
tion about patient demographics, hourly vital sign measurements,
laboratory test results, procedures, medications, ICD-9 codes, care-
giver notes and imaging reports.
Our experiment uses records from a collection of patients, each
being a multivariate time series consisting of 19 variables from vital
sign measurements (6) and lab events (13). Vital signs include heart
rate (HR), systolic blood pressure (SBP), diastolic blood pressure
(DBP), temperature (TEMP), respiratory rate (RR), and oxygen satu-
ration (SPO2). Lab measurements include: Lactate, partial pressure
of carbon dioxide (PaCO2), PH, Albumin (Alb), HCO3, calcium (Ca),
creatinine (Cre), glucose (Glc), magnesium (Mg), potassium (K),
sodium (Na), blood urea nitrogen (BUN), and Platelet count.
Imputation. MIMIC-III contains numerous missing values and
outliers. We first impute missing values using average across time
stamps for each record sequence. Then we remove and impute
outlier recordings using the interquartile range (IQR) criteria. For
each feature, we flatten across all subjects and time stamps and
calculate the IQR value. Lower and upper bound values are defined
as 1.5 IQR below the first quartile (Q1) and 1.5 IQR above the third
quartile (Q3). Values out of these bounds are considered as outliers.
For each outlier, we impute its value in a carry-forward fashion
from the previously available time stamp. If the outlier occurs at
the first time stamp, we impute its value using the EHR average
across all remaining time stamps.
Padding. One challenge facing EHR data is that time-series record-
ings are measured asynchronously, often yielding sequential data
of different lengths. In previous works, this problem was addressed
by taking hourly averages of each feature over the course of an
admission [17]. This method allows for hourly alignment features
for each patient across visits. For our temporal features, the mean
length of observation is 60, and median length is 32. We pad all
sequences into the same length (48 hours) by pre-padding short
sequence using a masking value and pre-truncating long sequences.
Therefore all the sequences are aligned to the most recent events
and are aligned across each time step.
Normalization. After imputation and padding, we obtain a tensor
with three dimensions: observation, time and feature. We normal-
ize using min-max normalization, i.e., for each feature, we collect
minimum and maximum values across all observations and time
stamps and normalize by:
Xnew =
X −min (X )
max (X ) −min (X ) , (6)
where the reason is that different measurements have different
range and scale, and possibly different tolerance to perturbations.
We want to make perturbations among measurements comparable
and the calculation of perturbation score more consistent. After
normalization, we have 37,559 multivariate time series with 19
variables across 48 time stamps.
4.2 Predictive Modeling Performance
Imbalanced data. In order to train a good classifier, we use 5-
fold cross-validation. However, among 37,559 observations, there
are only 11.1% (4153) deceased labels which make our data highly
imbalanced. Therefore, we down-sample observations from the
negative class during train-test splitting. We split data into 5 folds
in a stratified manner so that the ratio of positive to negative class
remains the same as the original dataset on each split. With 5-fold
validation, each fold serves as testing fold once, and the other 4 folds
become merged and down-sampled to produce balanced training
sets. We split the balanced training fold again by 4:1 ratio and treat
as training and validation set respectively.
Network Architecture. Considering that an overtly complex ar-
chitecture may increase the instability of the network, we use a
similar architecture as [24] but with simpler settings. Our net-
work contains 3 layers: an LSTM layer, a fully-connected layer
Table 1: Performance of 5-fold cross validation for LSTM.
Metric AUC F1 Precision Recall
Avg.±SD 0.9094±0.0053 0.5429±0.0194 0.4100±0.0272 0.8071±0.0269
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(a) Perturbation 0 to 1. (b) Magnitude vs Sparsity.
(c) Perturbation 1 to 0. (d) Magnitude vs Sparsity.
Figure 2: Adversarial attack for random chosen patients.
followed by soft-max layer. We choose the number of nodes using
cross-validation and end up with each layer containing 128, 32 and
2 hidden nodes respectively. We then retrain the entire training
folds (training + validation) and assess performance on the testing
set, which can be found in Table 1. The resulting LSTM classifier
achieves average 0.9094 (0.0053) AUC and 0.5429 (0.0194) f1 score
across all folds.
4.3 Susceptibility Detection
We apply the proposed attack framework on correct classified sam-
ples and generate susceptibility scores at two levels: patient level
and cohort level.
Sensitivity at patient Level.There exists two directions of attacks
in binary classification tasks, ie., perturb from negative class to
positive and vice versa. Figure 2 shows the adversarial attack results
for two patients from each of the attack groups. Figure 2a and 2c
illustrates a distribution of perturbations for a successful adversarial
record, ie., X ′ − X . The color represents perturbation magnitude
at each measurement and time stamp. Note that the adversarial
records which generate the perturbations are chosen from a series
of candidate adversarial records via minimizing the perturbation
distance score mentioned previously.
We can see that most of the spots are zeros, indicating that
no perturbations are made. Among the perturbed locations, we
observe a clear pattern along the time axis, which indicates that
recent events are more likely to be perturbed compared to distant
events. This is consistent with our initial hypothesis that structured
perturbation can be more effective. In fact, due to the remember-
and-forget mechanism of LSTM networks, the attack algorithm
automatically learns to attack this type of model with different
degrees of focus for different locations. Our second hypothesis is
also verified by the fact that different measurements tend to have
varying tolerance to perturbations, as some measurements are not
chosen to be attacked while others are more frequently perturbed.
(0⇒ 1) Attack (1⇒ 0) Attack
(a) Maximum Perturbation
(b) Average Perturbation
(c) Perturbation Probability
Figure 3: Adversarial attacks (Left: 0 ⇒ 1, Right: 1 ⇒ 0) at
population level .
Figure 2b and 2d presents the maximum perturbation for a pa-
tient under different sparsity control. Each regularization parameter
generates an adversarial candidate. We can observe the trade-off be-
tween perturbation magnitude and sparsity. When only a few spots
are attacked, in order to generate success attack, the magnitude
of perturbation tends to be large; As more locations change, the
perturbation can be flattened to each spot and the magnitude drops
quickly. Once over a certain threshold, the maximum perturbation
remains similar afterward.
Clinical Interpretation By observing the differences in suscep-
tibility to perturbation magnitude and direction across time, clini-
cians can determine which lab features are robust for consideration
in personalized mortality risk assessment. For example, given the
perturbation distribution (from an optimal adversarial record) for a
patient, we can identify specific regions which warrant increased
attention. Given the sample patient in Figure 2a, we see that arterial
carbon dioxide levels (PaCO2), Creatinine (Cre) and Sodium (Na)
are more susceptible under the current prediction model. Specifi-
cally, we see that increase in PaCO2, decrease in Cre and Na levels
render the original classifier susceptible to misclassification. In the
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(a) Time-Measurement sensitivity
score distribution.
(b) Measurement sensitivity
score.
Figure 4: Susceptibility at population level (0 to 1).
(a) Success rate at different
maximum perturbation.
(b) Average perturbation
percentage corresponds to 5a.
Figure 5: Adversarial perturbation assessment.
reverse case, a comparison between 2a and 2c reveals that the direc-
tion of perturbation on PaCO2, Cre and Na are reversed to achieve
misclassification from deceased to alive, which is consistent with
our intuition. These results suggest that small errors in Cre, PaCO2
and Na measurements can introduce a significant vulnerability in
the mortality assessment of these two sample patients.
Additionally, the direction of perturbation sensitivity can lead
to varying interpretation at different time steps. For example, we
see from 2a and 2c that fluctuations in Na levels are susceptible
to different directions of perturbation at various time points. At
around 8 hours before prediction time (hours 38-44), overestimation
in Na levels from laboratory tests renders the classifier susceptible
to misclassification toward the alive label, while overestimation
at prediction time (48th hour) may cause misclassification toward
the deceased label. Perturbation matrix in this case may help guide
interpretation of mortality risk with fluctuations in measurement
at various time points for certain features.
Sensitivity at population Level.While patient-targeted attack re-
veals vulnerability signals at a personalized level, cohort or population-
level analysis is needed to determine the vulnerability of diagnostic
features over the entire EHR dataset. Therefore, we also adopt sus-
ceptibility score at the cohort level using predefined metrics. We
first evaluate performance for a given fold and then extend to all
the folds to check for consistency.
Population-level trade-off. Figure 6 shows the maximum perturba-
tion and percentage of perturbation under different sparsity control
at population-level. We can see that as regularization increases, the
maximum perturbation increases across all observations. Similarly,
there is a more clear pattern for perturbation percentage with re-
spect to regularization. A huge penalty would eventually encourage
no spots to be changed and end up with failed adversarial records.
Figure 6c indicates whether adversarial is successful, 0 for failure
Table 2: Rank of measurements based on susceptible score.
Rank 0-1 Attack 1-0 AttackMeasurement Susceptible Score Measurement Susceptible Score
1 Na 0.64 (0.13) Cre 1.95 (0.46)
2 PaCO2 0.61 (0.13) Na 1.48 (0.21)
3 HCO3 0.57 (0.13) Lactate 0.72 (0.33)
4 Glc 0.51 (0.12) HCO3 0.56 (0.27)
5 Cre 0.46 (0.15) PH 0.54 (0.15)
6 Albumin 0.39 (0.07) Albumin 0.54 (0.23)
7 HR 0.30 0.05) DBP 0.47 (0.15)
8 Mg 0.25 (0.06) Mg 0.45 (0.11)
9 BUN 0.20 (0.03) PaCO2 0.43 (0.39)
10 K 0.19 (0.06) SBP 0.40 (0.15)
11 RR 0.15 (0.08) RR 0.38 (0.14)
12 PH 0.14 (0.12) SPO2 0.28 (0.16)
13 SPO2 0.13 (0.11) Ca 0.25 (0.08)
14 Ca 0.11 (0.04) K 0.18 (0.08)
15 Platelets 0.10 (0.03) HR 0.13 (0.06)
16 Lactate 0.08 (0.07) Glc 0.13 (0.11)
17 SBP 0.07 (0.04) Platelets 0.11 (0.10)
18 TEMP 0.05 (0.03) BUN 0.09 (0.03)
19 DBP 0.04 (0.03) TEMP 0.04 (0.02)
1 for success respectively, across different regularizations. We can
see that the attack generate success adversarial records most of the
time.
Figure 3 shows the global maximum perturbation (GMP), global
average perturbation (GAP) and global perturbation probability
(GPP) at each time-measurement grid for 0-1 attack ((left) and 1-0
attack (right) respectively. Figure 4a shows the susceptibility score
distribution while considering all patients in a fold for 0-1 attack.
We can see that measurement PaCO2, Albumin, Glc (7, 9 and 13)
at prediction time are the most susceptible locations for mortality
prediction model. Similar to the patient-targeted case, not all the
measurements have perturbation susceptibility concentrated at
the most recent time steps. We observe that measurements RR,
SPO2, Na (4, 5 and 16) tends to be more susceptible at earlier time
stamps. We repeat evaluation for all 5 folds and found that the
results are quite similar. Considering all the time stamps, we obtain
a susceptibility score for each measurement by summing the scores
across the time axis. Figure 4b shows the average sensitivity score
and 95% confidence band for each measurement across all 5 folds.
Same plots are made for 1-0 attack and can be found at Figure 7.
Table 2 shows the ranking of sensitivity for all the measurements.
Clinical Interpretation Similar to the patient-level patterns, we
also observe differences in perturbation sparsity and magnitude
across various features at the population-level. Figure 3 (c) shows
the probability that a perturbation at certain time steps would lead
to misclassification from alive to deceased. This figure can be in-
terpreted as the distribution of susceptibility of each feature across
time over the entire EHR dataset. Cold-spots in this grid relate to
low probabilities of attack, signaling to the clinician that features
associated with those areas are more robust to attack. On the other
hand, Figure 3 (b) illustrates the average perturbation over the EHR
population for each feature across time. In this grid, we are more
concerned about the hot-spots, as cold-spots alone do not rule-out
the possibility of LSTM-attack since they only indicate small mag-
nitude of perturbations. However, hot-spots in this grid, indicate
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(a) Maximum perturbation. (b) Perturbation percentage. (c) Success Indicator.
Figure 6: Adversarial attack for all patients in a random fold.
preferential spots of LSTM-attack, which rules-in highly suscepti-
ble features of the EHR population for misclassification. Figure 3
(a) illustrates the element-wise max perturbation for each feature
across all time-steps in the database. As seen from 1, LSTM-attacks
are regularized by the magnitude of the perturbation. In the case
where the original LSTM classifier is uncertain of the classifica-
tion decision, the associated data points are closer to the decision
boundary, requiring smaller perturbation to achieve misclassifica-
tion. In the opposite case where data points are further away from
the classifier decision boundary, more perturbation is required to
cause misclassification. Thus, the max-perturbation grid shown in
3 (a) represents the average LSTM prediction certainty over the
EHR record samples; a max-perturbation grid that is dominated by
cold-spots reflects a classifier that is mostly uncertain of its predic-
tions, yielding to small perturbations required for misclassification.
A max-perturbation grid that is hot-spot dominant indicates a clas-
sifier that is highly certain of its predictions, as max-thresholds of
perturbation required is higher for most of its samples.
Additionally, these results may be used to provide clinical de-
cision support in determining the optimal rate of sampling for
individual clinical features. For example, while vital signs (features
0-5) are obtained at all times for each patient admitted to the ur-
gent care, laboratory tests such as comprehensive metabolic panels
(CMP) are much more costly to obtain, especially for patients who
require a long length of stays [19]. Using our attack framework, a
clinician can opt to perform an initial prediction at the beginning
of an admission to gauge mortality risk of a patient, and then de-
termine the sampling rate for certain laboratory tests depending
on the susceptibility score of the clinical feature to perturbations
across time. For example, Table 2 can give clinicians an initial in-
terpretation of the validity of the mortality risk obtained from a
prediction model at admission time, while Figure 4 may inform
when and how frequently subsequent laboratory tests should be
done to update mortality risk evaluation. By sampling at an optimal
rate which adjusts for perturbation of measurements across time,
clinicians can potentially save cost associated with frequent use
of expensive diagnostic tests without sacrificing the accuracy of
clinical assessment.
(a) Time-Measurement score. (b) Measurement score.
Figure 7: Susceptibility at population level (1 to 0).
(a) Success rate at different
maximum perturbation.
(b) Average perturbation
percentage corresponds to 8a.
Figure 8: Adversarial perturbation assessment (1 to 0).
4.4 Adversarial assessment.
While our ultimate goal is to utilize attack results to detect sus-
ceptibility locations of clinical records, we do not enforce strict
constraints on the attacks. We assess our adversarial attack by suc-
cess rate achieved at different maximum perturbation across all
patients and the corresponding perturbation percentage at each
stage. Results are shown in Figure 5. We can see that more than
half of the patients can be perturbed with maximum perturbation
less than 0.15 by only changing 3% of the record locations for 0-1
attack. The 1-0 direction is relatively harder to attack compared to
the other.
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In this paper, we proposed an efficient and effective framework
that identifies susceptible locations in medical records utilizing
adversarial attacks on deep predictive models. Our results demon-
strated the vulnerability of deep models, where more than half of
the patients can be successfully attacked by changing only 3% of
the record locations with maximum perturbation less than 0.15
and average perturbation less than 0.02. The proposed screening
approach can detect susceptible events and locations at both patient
and population level, providing valuable information and assistance
for clinical professionals. In addition, the framework can be easily
extend to other predictive modeling on time series data.
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